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Abstract
This article examines the state of judicial protection in the European Community system
largely against the background of the debate of recent years, and discusses critically the ostrichlike reaction of the Court to the chorus of criticism relating to its interpretation of the concept of
“individual concern” in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (“EC Treaty”). It also examines the attempt in the Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe to establish a different approach to admissibility in respect of some types of Community acts.

JUDICIAL REVIEW: ADVICE FOR THE DEAF?
Laurence W. Gormley*
INTRODUCTION
The health of the law relating to judicial review is a good
indicator of the status of the rule of law in any State or even in
any international organization. Open, transparent, and genuine
access to judicial review, and the ability and willingness of judicial institutions to examine the acts of the administration lie at
the heart of good democratic structures of government and indeed form an essential, if sometimes overlooked, aspect of good
governance.' For common law attorneys in particular, judicial
review has always been an important aspect of European Community and European Union law, even though many lawyers in
continental Europe display remarkably little interest in the subject. For British Advocates General2 at the Court ofJustice of the
European Communities ("the Court"), not surprisingly, judicial
review has always been of major interest. Jean-Pierre Warner's
Opinion in the Japanese Ball Bearings cases3 forced a revision of
the rights of the defence in anti-dumping procedures; the remarkable two-volume Liber Amicorum4 for Gordon Slynn dealt
with judicial review (in European and international law). This
was particularly appropriate in view of Eleanor Sharpston's observation in her discussion of the Supplementary Levy on Milk
* B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976 London University (LSE);
Barrister (Middle Temple 1978), LL.D., Utrecht University (1985); Professor of European Law & Jean Monnet Professor, Groningen University (The Netherlands), Jean
Monnet Centre of Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium).
1. The Commission of the European Communities ("Community") defines "Governance" as meaning rules, processes and behavior that affect the way in which powers
are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. See Commission White Paperon European Governance, at 8 n.1, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001), available at http://europa.cu.int/
eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_OO23enOl.pdf (last visited Apr.
8, 2006).
2. So far, there have been four Advocates General: Jean-Pierre Warner; Gordon
Slynn; Francis Jacobs; and his successor, Eleanor Sharpston.
3. See NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council, Case 113/77, [1979] E.C.R. 1185,
1259, 1261-65, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 257, 266.
4. See 1 LIBER AMICORUM LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN
UNION LAW (Davide O'Keefe ed., 2000) [hereinafter 1 LIBER AMICORUM SLYNNI; see also
2 LIBER AMICORUM LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Mads Andenas ed., 2000).
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litigation that:

As well as facing the political embarrassment, and the considerable administrative inconvenience and difficulty generated
by all the SLOM litigation, the Community institutions therefore also found themselves footing some of the bill for the
damage flowing from the original SLOM measures. And all
because Advocate General Slynn and the Court couldn't
stomach a little basic injustice...'

Moreover, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat's overview of some
Opinions of Gordon Slynn 7 rightly highlighted his important
contributions to judicial protection in AM & SEuropeLtd. v Commission8 and InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v Commission'.

Francis Jacobs too will be remembered for his outstanding contribution to diverse fields of Community law and human rights, t °
but perhaps most of all for his distinguished and challenging
contributions in the field of judicial protection.'" With that in
mind, this contribution examines the state ofjudicial protection

in the Community system largely against the background of the
debate of recent years, and discusses critically the ostrich-like reaction of the Court to the chorus of criticism relating to its interpretation of the concept of "individual concern" in the fourth
paragraph of Article 230 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"). 1 2 It also examines the attempt in the
5. See Council Regulation No. 856/84, O.J. L 90/10 (1984); see also Council Regulation No. 857/84, OJ. L 90/13 (1984); Commission Regulation No. 1371/84, O.J. L
132/11 (1984), amended ly OJ L139/12 (1988).
6. Eleanor Sharpston, Milk Lakes, Sloms and Legitimate Expectations-A Paradigm in
JudicialReview, in I LIBER AMICORUM SLYNN, supra note 4, 557, 567. See, e.g., Mulder v.
Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, Case 120/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2321; Spagl v. Hauptzolamt Rosenheim, Case C-189/99, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4539, [1991-1193 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH)
95, 818, at 52, 124-25.
7. See Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Some Opinions of Sir Gordon Slynn as Advocate
General, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM SLYNN, supra note 4, 3, 4-5.
8. See Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Australian Mining & Smelting Europe
Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264.
9. See Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635.
10. See e.g., FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996); EUROPEAN LAW IN THE ENGLISH COURTS (Mads
Andenas & FrancisJacobs eds., 1998).
11. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Union de Pequefios Agricultores
v. Council, Case C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 1 [hereinafter
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA].
12. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 230, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 126 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
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Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe"3 to establish a different approach to admissibility in respect of some types of Community acts.
I. ADMISSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS-GENERAL POINTS
Clarence J. Mann has noted that judicial control in the
Communities is fashioned to meet the requirements of political
organization and economic regulation in new forms of international organization.1 4 He saw the scope of review as reflecting a
balance between two competing considerations: the absence of
well-developed political controls in the Community called for
the broad exercise of judicial review in order to prevent the
abuse of power by highly independent Community organs, but
this unprecedented attempt at economic integration demanded
flexible management of Community powers.1" Thus, the decisions of Community organs necessarily had to be based on the
evaluation of economic facts, trends, and situations, for which
no firm standards existed; only to a limited extent could they be
accessible to legal analysis and the normative judgments of the
13. See Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C 310/1
(2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Constitution].
14. See CLARENCEJ. MANN, THE FUNCTION OFJUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC INTEGRATION 51 (1972). Mann saw the balance as being drawn on seven separate
grounds of judicial review-the four mentioned in Articles 33 and 38 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"); Article 230 of
the Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"); and Article 146 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty"), the review of acts using unlimited jurisdiction under Article 66(5) and 95 of the ECSC Treaty (approval of mergers and acquisitions; and small
Treaty revisions, respectively), the procedure of Article 37 of the ECSC Treaty (Commission reaction or inaction which "is of a nature to provoke fundamental and persistent disturbances" in the economies of the Member States); and, finally, instances in
which unlimited jurisdiction is conferred in respect of penalties imposed by the Community institutions under Articles 88 and 36 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 229 of the EC
Treaty and Article 144 of the Euratom Treaty-this is particularly evident in, e.g., the
fields of anti-trust and anti-dumping. See id. at 51-61 and accompanying text. The ECSC
Treaty expired on July 23, 2002. As to unlimited jurisdiction, see generally, KP.E.
LASOK & TIMOTHY MILLETr, JUDICIAL CONTROL IN THE EU, 71,
136-39 (2004) and
HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 518-19, § 1044 (6th ed. 2001). For a more general overview on judicial protection, see KOEN LENAERTS & DIRK ARTS, PROCEDURAL LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Robert Bray ed., 1999); ANGELA WARD, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000); and ALBERTINA ALBORs-LLORENS, PRIVATE PARTIES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: CHALLENGING COMMUNITY MEASURES (1996).
15. See Mann, supra note 14, at 51.
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Court. 6 He further noted that it was neither desirable nor intended to raise the Court above the Community executive and
quasi-legislative organs "zum h6chsten WiLensorgan in wirtschafiliche
Fragen."1 7 Against this background, it is unsurprising that the
Court has consistently upheld a considerable margin of discretion for the Council and Commission in economic policy assessments,"' an approach, which is particularly visible in the agricultural policy sphere.1 9 Nevertheless, that discretion is not unfettered, and the Court has been willing to examine whether the
Community institutions have remained within the bounds of
their discretion.2" The central controversy in the Court's approach to judicial review concerns its policy on the admissibility
of actions, rather than its practice as to the substantive grounds
for review.
While addressees of Community decisions have no problem
in bringing actions to the Court, the situation relating to the
protection of persons other than the addressees of decisions has
been unsatisfactory from the early days of Community law. The
problem does not so much lie in the language of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty, as in the Court's interpretation of it. That provision states:
Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision
person, is of direct and individual conaddressed to another
21
cern to the former.
16. See id.
17. See id. (citing various contemporary documents preparing the way for the
ECSC Treaty).
18. See, e.g., Balkan-Import Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, Case
55/75, [1976] E.C.R. 19, 30, 18 [hereinafter Balkan-Import]; SA Roquette Frres v.
Council, Case 138/79, [1980] E.C.R. 3333, 3358-59, 1 25; Belgium v. Commission, Case
C-56/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-723, 772, 11 [hereinafter RoquetteFreres];Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Commission, Case T-358/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11-2109, 2135, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 492, 497 [hereinafter Compagnie Nationale].
19. See RENI BARENTs, THE AGRICULTURAL LAW OF THE EC: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE

(1994).
20. See, e.g., Bock v. Commission, Case 62/70, [1971] E.C.R. 897, 909-910, 11 1215, [1972] 1 C.M.L.R. 160, 172; Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case 98/78,
5;John Deere Ltd. v. Commission, Case G-7/95P, [1998] E.C.R.
[1979] E.C.R. 69, 81,
1-3111, 3150-51, 11 31-37, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 311, 346-47; Italy v. Commission, Case G100/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-5217, 5252, 5258, 5260, It 36, 62, 68-70.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 126.

2006]

JUDICIAL REVIEW ADVICE FOR THE DEAF?

Although the criteria of "direct concern" and "individual concern" are separate criteria, the concept of "direct concern" has
proved uncontroversial in practice.2 2 The concept of "individual
concern" has, however, proved difficult and controversial since
the beginning.
In its now notorious judgment in Plaumann v Commission,2 3
the Court interpreted the words "individual concern" thus:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed
may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar
to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the
person addressed.2 4
Given that the applicant was affected by the disputed decision as
an importer of clementines, the Court concluded that there was
no feature which distinguished him in relation to the contested
decision as in the case of the addressee, pointing out that the
applicant was merely engaged in a commercial activity which
could be practised by any person at any time.25 Looking at the
judgment in Plaumann against the light of Advocate General
Roemer's Opinion in that case, the basis for this approach becomes slightly clearer. He observed a fundamental difference
between judicial review under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty") and judicial
review under what is now the EC Treaty.2 6 In the former case he
22. If an act is sufficiently clear and leaves no discretion to its addressee-or the
addressee has indicated how it will act if permitted to do so-the European Court of
Justice ("Court") quickly finds that an applicant is directly concerned. See, e.g., SA
Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, Case 11/82, [1985] E.C.R. 207, 241-42,
4-10, [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 4, 23-24; Socit6 Louis Dreyfus & C"e v. Commission, Case C-386/96P, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-2309, 2370-71, 1 43-47, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 481, 534-35.
23. See Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/62, [1963] E.C.R. 95, [1964] C.M.L.R.
29.
24. Id. at 107, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 47.
25. See id.
26. See Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/
62, [1963] E.C.R. 95, 115 [1964] C.M.L.R. 29, 36. Gerhard Bebr explained the purpose
of annulment actions brought by private parties as serving not only to ensure a legal
exercise of Community powers but also to protect interests of private parties against the
illegal use of those powers. Like Advocate General Roemer, Bebr observed that the
drafters of the EC Treaty sought to limit, if not exclude, annulment actions brought by
private parties against normative acts of the Community institutions; moreover, they
sought to exclude any possible actiopopularis. See GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OFJUDI-
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saw the legal nature of a contested measure as paramount in fixing the limit of the right of action, so an individual decision affecting the applicant was sufficient. 27 In the EC Treaty (and in

the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty")),28 on the other hand, he noted that
account was already taken of the legal nature of the measures in
the definition of the right of action by contrasting regulations
and decisions; he therefore adopted the Commission's standpoint that there must have been an intention to limit further by
the criterion of "individual concern" the right of action by reference to legal effects. 29 He found that the Commission's decision
rejecting the request by the German government for authorization to suspend in part the general external tariff for fresh clementines was of a similar nature to an authorisation for suspension of customs duties involving an amendment of national customs laws.3" He noted that all those wishing to import
clementines in the course of 1962 were concerned and that it
could well be that at the end of that year the number of those
concerned was relatively small and easily ascertainable."' However he found that this point could not be decisive: for Mr Roemer the important thing was that the concern did not arise from
the individuality of particular persons but from membership of
the abstractly defined group of all those who wished to import
clementines during the period in question; their class was not
ascertainable at the time of issue of the decision because, by its
CIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 21 (1981). However, note that the view
that the Member States consciously wanted to make what is now Article 230 of the EC
Treaty more restrictive than Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty is not universally shared. See
SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 14, 428, § 868. For more on public interest litigation (actio popularis) in European Community law, see H.-W. MICKLITZ & N. REICH,
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION BEFORE EUROPEAN COURTS (1996); Laurence W. Gormley,
Public InterestLitigation, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM SLYNN, supra, note 4, at 191; and Laurence
W. Gormley, Judicial Review in the EC and EU Law-Some Architectural Malfunctions and
Design Improvements? 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. oF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 167 (2001). For those who
do not read German, Laurence Gormley's article also includes a brief summary of Norbert Reich's proposal about a European Fundamental Right Action, which appears in
ZeitschriftfiirRechtspolitik 375 (2000).See further 0. de Schutter, L'Acces de Groupements d
laJustice Communautaire, 7JOURN. DES TRIB. DROIT EUR. 153 (1999).
27. See Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Plaumann, [1963] E.C.R. at 115;
[1964] C.M.L.R. at 36.
28. See id. at 116, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 36.
29. See id. at 116, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 36-37.
30. See id. at 116, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 37.
31. See id.
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nature, it was constantly changing, though in practice only to a
32
limited degree.
The point about the class of people being ascertainable at
the time of issue of a decision would later be fundamental to the
celebrated judgment in Toepfer.3 s In that case the only persons
concerned by the measures which the Commission adopted were
importers who had applied for an import licence on October 1,
1963. 3 ' The number and identity of these importers had already
become fixed and ascertainable before the contested decision
was adopted on October 4, 1963.3' Accordingly, the Commission was in a position to know that its decision affected the interests and position of those importers alone.3 6 The fundamental
difference between Plaumann and Toepfer was that the class of
persons affected was closed at the date of the Commission's decision addressed to the German government. 37 Economic operators, however, have often understandably felt that in reality the
number of importers for a particular product is eminently
known and predictable, and thus it is unsurprising that traders
are often bemused by the Plaumann definition of "individual
concern",3 1 In these circumstances, with no redress open at the
Community level, traders are left to the mercy of their national
legal systems; the only hope is to attack national measures taken
in pursuit of the Community measure and to attack the Community measure indirectly by persuading a national judge that it
may be invalid and that the judge should make a reference to
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 of
32. See id.
33. See Alfred Toepfer et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, [1965]
E.C.R. 405, 411-12, [1966] C.M.L.R. 111, 141-42.
34. See id. at 411, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 142.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Bock v. Commission, Case 62/70, [1971] E.C.R. 897, 908, 1 10, [1972]
C.M.L.R. 160, 171.
38. If a Community act has specifically taken into account the situation of the applicants, they will be individually concerned and by that act; however, if the applicants
were merely known or identifiable at the time when the act was adopted, that will not
be sufficient to conferred individual concern-an applicant must also show that his or
her specific situation was taken into consideration by the Community organ concerned.
See, e.g., Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission, Case 231/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2559, 2566, 8,
[1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 284, 292; Albertal SAT Ltda et al. v. Council, Case C-264/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-3265, 3279-80,
16; Roquetterres, Case T-298/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11-1531 154445, 42; Area Cova SA et al. v. Council & Commission, Case T-12/96, [1999] E.C.R. II2301, 2315,
32.
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the EC Treaty. 9
While the Court has stuck to the Plaumann approach
through thick and thin, it has become apparent that in certain
types of cases the soup is consumed less hot than it is served.
Thus the Court has even permitted individual applicants to challenge truly normative Community acts if they can satisfy the criterion of direct and individual concern.4" In various fields4"
where there is a specific legal framework within which an applicant has actively participated in the procedure leading up to the
adoption of a Community act4 2 or has been prevented from par-

39. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 234, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 127-28. This
supposes that there is a national measure resulting from the Community measure; as is
discussed below, which may not always be the case, and, if so, the trader has no recourse
at all. If a litigant would have had standing to bring an appeal, i.e., was the addressee or
fell within the known scope of being directly and individually concerned, hut failed to
do so, the Court will not entertain an Article 234 of the EC Treaty reference as a back
door way of seeking judicial review of the act concerned. See TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Germany, Case C-188/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-833, 852-53, 9 13-17;
[1995] C.M.L.R. 145, 159.
40. See, e.g., Codorniu S.A. v. Council, Case C-309/89, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1853, 188586, 7 17-20, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561, 587 (finding applicant to be directly and individually concerned); Antillean Rice Mills NV et al. v. Commission, Case C-390/95 P, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-769 at 810-11,
28; Union Europ~enne de l'Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Enterprises (UEAPME) v. Council, Case T-135/96, [1998] E.C.R. 11-2335 2362-63,
9 63-64, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 385, 406 (noting threshold of individual concern not
crossed).
41. Competition, State aids, and anti-dumping procedures are the most obvious
fields.
42. For complainants in competition and merger cases see, e.g., Metro SBGrolmftrkte & Co. KG v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, 1901,
13 and
France et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375,
1471-1472, 7 55-58. For those whose competitive situation is likely to be substantially
affected by an individual State aid decision see, e.g., Compagnie Franfaise, Case 169/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 391, 415, 24; Van der Kooy, Joined Cases 67, 68 & 70/85, [1988] E.C.R.
219, 268-69, 9 18-25; William Cook PLC v. Commission, Case C-198/91, [1993] E.C.R.
1-2487, 2528,
29; Comit6 International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthetiques
(CIRFS) v. Commission, Case C-313/90, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1125, 1185, 79 29-30; Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases T447-449/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1971, 1994-96, 58; and Association des Amidonneries de
C&rrales de la CEE (AAC) et al. v. Commission, Case T-442/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1329.
For anti-dumping cases see, e.g., EEC Seed Crushers'and Oil Processors' Federation
(Fediol) v. Commission, Case 191/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2913, 2934-36, 26-29; Timex Corporation v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, [1985] E.C.R. 849 at 865-66, 9 14-16;
Allied Corporation et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, [1984] E.C.R.
1005, 1030-31, 99 11-16; Allied Corporation et al. v. Council, Case 53/83, [1985] E.C.R.
1621 at 1655-56,
2-5; and Nashua Corporation v. Commission & Council, Joined
Cases C-133/87 & C-150/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-719 at 772-773, 91 14-21.
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ticipating, 4 the Court has been relatively willing to find applicants admissible, although mere participation will not be sufficient.4 4 Moreover, in some very specific circumstances, the
Court has been willing to find applicants admissible rather than
see manifest injustice occur. Thus, where the measure would
have serious economic effects for the applicant, 4 or where specific rights have been infringed,4 6 standing has more readily
been found. The fact remains however that standing has from
time to time been conferred in circumstances where a strict application of the Plaumann interpretation of individual concern
could not have justified it.4 7 The distinct impression is that that
the Court's willingness to be supple resembles the length of the
proverbial Lord Chancellor's foot.
A. From Murmur to Earthquake
Dissatisfaction with the Plaumann approach to individual
concern among Advocates General can be traced back a long
way; 48 and in academic circles has a long and distinguished heri43. See, e.g., William Cook PLC v. Commission, Case C-198/91, [1993] E.C.R. I2487, 2528, 11 23-26, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R 206, 237-38; Soci& Anonyme A Participation
Ouvri4 re Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Commission, Case T-3/93, [1994] E.C.R.
II-121, 161-63, 11 79-82; M~tropole T61vision SA et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases T528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 & T-546/93, [1996] E.C.R. 11-649, 674-75, 11 60-63.
44. See, e.g., Verening van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens et al. v. Commission,
Joined Cases T-481/93 & 484/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-2941, 2964-65 11 59-60, 62-63, 65;
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Untemehmen et al. v. Commission, Case T86/96, [1999] E.C.R. 11-179, 201, 11 61-65.
45. See, e.g., Partie lcologiste' Les Verts' v. European Parliament, Case 294/83,
[1986] E.C.R. 1339, 1368-69,
35-38, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343, 374 (reasoning on
grounds of inequality in judicial protection for the various groupings competing for
election to the European Parliament); Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Case C-358/
89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2501, 2532, 11 16-17, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R 619, 672 (noting serious
effect on competitive situation of applicant); Codorniu SA v. Council, Case C-309/89,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-1853, 1886,
21-23 (noting trademark owner unable to continue to
use a long-standing trademark).
46. See, e.g., Antillean Rice Mills NV et al. v. Commission,Joined Cases T-480/93 &
T-483/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-2305, 2331-35,
64-79; Antillean Rice Mills NV et al. v.
Commission, Case C-390/95P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-769, 810-11,
25-29 (confirming reasoning of court below).
47. Perhaps the most celebrated instance is Extramet Industrie v. Council, [1991]
E.C.R 1-2501, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, which is discussed below.
48. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Bethell v. Commission, Case 246/
81, [1982] E.C.R. 2277,
2299 ("[A]lthough I see much force in the argument that
natural and legal persons should have a wider right of challenge before the Court in
regard to the activities of the Commission, I am, for the reasons given, of the opinion
that the present application has to be declared inadmissible."). The learned Advocate
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tage, 9 but it is really since the 1990's that the storm clouds
started to gather for the assault on the Plaumann approach. As
noted above, there have been some celebrated occasions on
which the injustice and the strict application of Plaumann has
been so manifest that the Court has had to have recourse to pulling an equitable rabbit out of the proverbial hat to escape from
the digital straitjacket that its interpretation of the criterion of
individual concern in Plaumann has become. These early escapes from the straitjacket in Extramet5 ° and Cordorniu5 t involved, as Advocate General Lenz observed in the latter case, 2
the largest producer of the type of product involved; its economic activity was largely dependent on business transactions adversely affected by the contested regulation, and its activity was
severely affected by that regulation.5 3 The judgment in
Cordorniu has rightly been described as "terse, in places even inGeneral concluded that the commission's letter was not a decision which could be the
subject of review. See id.; see also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Extramet, Case C358/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2501 at 2523; Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Associzione Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovigo et al. v. Commission et al., Case C-142/95P,
42. Extra-judicially, members of the Court and of the
[1996] E.C.R. 1-6669, 6679,
Court of First Instance ("CFI") have made no secret of their dissatisfaction with
Plaumann. See the impressive list cited by Advocate GeneralJacobs in his UPA Opinion.
See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, Case C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677,
6682, 11 2 & 2 n.5, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
49. See, e.g., Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since
Cordorniu, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7 (2001); Lawrence W. Gormley, Judicial Review in
the EC and EU Law-Some ArchitecturalMalfunctions and Design Improvements? 4 THE CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 167 (2001); Anthony Arnull, PrivateApplicants and the
Action for Annulment Under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7,
(1995); Georges Vandersanden, Pour un Elargissement du Droit des ParticuliersDAgir en
Decisions qui leur sont Adressees, 31 CAH. DR. EUR.
Annulation Contre des Actes Autres que les
535 (1995); Denis Waelbroeck & A.-M. Verheyden, Les Conditions de Recevabilite des
Recours en Annulation des Particuliers Contre lesActes Normatifs Communautaires: A La
Lumiere du Droit Compare et de la Convention des Droits de L'Homme, 31 CAH. DR. EUR. 399
(1995); Hjalte Rasmussen, Why is Art. 173 Interpreted Against PrivatePlaintiffs?, 5 EUR. L.
REv. 112 (1980); Anthony Arnull, ChallengingEC Anti-Dumping Regulations: The Problem
of Admissibility, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 73 (1992); Carol Harlow, Toward a Theory of
Access for the European CourtofJustice, 12 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 213 (1992); Ami Barav, Direct and
Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrierto the Admissibility of Individual Appeal
to the EEC, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 191 (1974).
50. See Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Case C-358/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2501, 12532, 1 16-17, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R 619, 672.
51. See Codornfu SA v. Council, Case C-309/89, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1853, 1886, 20.
52. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Codomfu SA v. Council, Case C-309/
58.
89, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1853 at 1870-71,
53. See id. at 1-1870-71, 7 54, 58.
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coherent. '54 In Greenpeace55 and Danielsson56 the traditional hostile stance to standing for persons other than the addressees of
an act was clearly maintained. Thus, where
the specific situation of the applicant was not taken into consideration in the adoption of the act, which concerns him in a
general and abstract fashion and, in fact, like any other person in the same situation, the applicant is not individually
concerned by the act. The same applies to associations which
claim to have locus standi on the basis of the fact that persons
whom they represent are individually concerned.
Arnull has rightly opined that "it seems wrong in principle
that a litigant's right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court of law
should depend on factors which are unrelated to the circumstances of his claim and which may vary with the passage of
time."5 This sentiment was destined to find an echo in subsequent judicial pronouncements. He proposed that individual
concern should be defined as "an act adversely affecting an applicant's interests". 59 This reformulation of the meaning of the
term "individual concern" could indeed have been adopted by
the Court without a revision of the EC Treaty or even without
stretching its wording, although it would be more transparent to
substitute his proposed definition for the present criterion in a
Treaty amendment.
On March 21, 2000, in his rightly celebrated opinion in
Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council6 ° (" UPA'), Advocate General Jacobs delivered an earthquake which shook the Plateau de

54. See Anthony Arnull, ChallengingCommunity Acts-An Introduction, in MICKLITZ &
REICH, supra note 26, at 39, 46.
55. See Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) et al. v. Com59-65; see also Stichting
mission, Case T-585/93, [1995] E.C.R.T. 11-2205, 2230-32,
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) et al. v. Commission, Case C-321/95P,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-1651, 1715-16, 11 27-35.
56. See Danielsson et al. v. Commission, Case T-219/95R, [1995] E.C.R. 11-3051, 307174,
66-77 (deciding under the Euratom Treaty).
57. Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International)et al. v. Commission, Case C,28-29.
321/95P, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1651, 1715,
58. Anthony Arnull, Challenging Community Acts-An Introduction, in MICKLITZ &
REiCH, supra note 26, at 51.
59. Id. at 53-54.
60. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, Case C-50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. I6677, 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 1.
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Kirchberg 61 to its foundations. He dismissed the adequacy of
leaving the challenge of normative acts largely to the national
courts." In sum, his argument that proceedings before national
courts may not provide effective judicial protection of individual
applicants is, unlike ancient Gaul, divided into four parts.
Firstly, national courts may not themselves declare Community
law measures invalid; their limited competence in such matters is
in stark contrast to their important role in relation to the application, enforcement and interpretation of Community law.6 3
Secondly, there is no right of access to the Court for a remedy
under Article 234 of the EC Treaty;6 4 national courts have discretion whether to refer cases, and, even in those cases where there
is an obligation to refer, they may err in their assessment of the
necessity of a reference or in the questions posed.6 5 Thirdly,
where Community measures do not require implementing acts,
or where national authorities do not base their own acts on a
Community framework, there may be no possibility at all of challenging Community measures; and to say that a person must ostensibly breach directly applicable Community law and face civil
or even criminal proceedings in order to try to get a reference
does not encourage respect for the rule of law.6 6 His fourth, and
final, consideration relates to procedural disadvantages: substantial extra delays and costs. Moreover, the willingness of national courts to order the interim suspension of Community
measures pending a ruling from the Court may vary from Member State to Member State, which could prejudice the uniform
application of Community law or even totally subvert it.67
61. Plateau de Kirchberg is on the outskirts of Luxembourg City and is where the
Court's buildings are located.
62. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6693, 40,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 18.
63. See id. at 1-6693,
41, 3 C.M.L.R. at 18.
64. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 234, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 127-28; see also
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6693,
42, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. at 18-19.
65. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6693, 1 42,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 18-19. The Court may, however, reformulate the questions, but a
reference cannot be wholly reinvented.
66. See id. at 1-6694, 43, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1-6694, 43. This point bears interesting comparison with the disgraceful circumstances in R v. Tymen, Case 269/80,
[1981] E.C.R. 3079.
67. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6694,
44,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 19.
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Mr. Jacobs went on to observe that an action for annulment
before the Court was a more appropriate vehicle for deciding
issues of validity issues than Article 234 of the EC Treaty. A full
exchange of pleadings is possible in a direct action, but under
Article 234 only one round of pleading takes place before the
hearing.6" In a direct action, intervention by interested third
parties is possible, but this is impossible on a reference unless
the third-party had intervened in the litigation before the national courts.6" Finally, challenges to Community acts have to be
brought to the Court quickly, and the application of strict standing criterion at the Community level means that those who fall
outside the criterion are left to take their chances in the national
forum.7" This has the disadvantage of reducing legal certainty
by effectively extending the possibility of challenge without a
limited time.7 1 Although mixed issues of validity and interpretation might appropriately be left to the national court filtration
mechanism of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the learned Advocate General concluded that where only the validity was at issue,
the more appropriate route would be the direct action for annulment. 7 2 In any event, an appeal against a ruling of the Court
of First Instance ("CFI") on points of law alone is open to the
Court of Justice itself.7' However, the learned Advocate General
concluded that those who were not individually concerned
should not automatically be given standing if they could show
that no other effective judicial protection was available to the
applicant.7 4 The absence of national remedies is not, he opined,
a matter for Community law, nor is it for the centralised Community judiciary to examine the details of national procedural
law.75 Making standing dependant on national law would also
risk divergence and inequality developing in access to the Court
68. See id. at 1-6695, 46, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 20.
69. See id. at 1-6695, 47, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 2047.
70. See id. at 1-6695-97, 11 47-53, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 20-22.
71. This would not be a route available to someone with standing to challenge a
Community act directly but did not avail himself of that right. See TWD Textilwerke
Deggendorf GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-188/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-833
at 852-53,
18.
72. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6699, 65, 3
C.M.L.R. at 24.
73. See id. at 1-6709,
92, 3 C.M.L.R. at 33.
74. See id. at 1-6696,
50, 3 C.M.L.R. at 21.
75. See id. at 1-6696, 1 52, 3 C.M.L.R. at 21.
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ofJustice for litigants from different Member States.76 In view of
all these considerations, Advocate General Jacobs proposed that
the notion of individual concern should be reinterpreted: accordingly, he proposed that, "an applicant is individually concerned by a Community measure where the measure has, or is
liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests."7 7
As will be apparent, this test is stricter than that advocated
by Arnull, because of the addition of the word "substantial."
This test was to leave considerable room for the court to take a
view on the individual merits of each case as to admissibility, but
it would be a higher threshold for cowboy claimants, while being
more liberal than the traditional approach of the Court. Mr.
Jacobs noted a number of arguments in favour of his text.7"
Firstly, in view of the rejection of the option of granting automatic standing in the absence of other effective judicial protection, this was the only way of avoiding a denial of justice.7 9 Secondly, it would ensure that individual applicants who were directly and adversely affected by Community acts would never be
without a remedy, while having the additional advantage of allowing validity issues relating to normative acts to be addressed
in the best forum (one which could also grant effective interim
relief).8O Thirdly, it would provide clarity to a body of law that
many commentators viewed as at best conceptually uncertain."
Fourthly, it would encourage validity issues to be resolved in direct actions rather than through the precarious route of national
courts and Article 234 of the EC Treaty. 2 As a penultimate
point, Mr. Jacobs felt that this interpretation would transfer the
emphasis of judicial review from admissibility issues to issues of
substance. 3 Finally, he identified a number of anomalies in the
case law on judicial review arising from the different approaches
to the notion of "individual concern" and to the other parts of
Article 230 of the EC Treaty, 4 and from the fact that there were
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
cil, Case

See id. at 1-6695-97, 1 53, 3 C.M.L.R. at 22.
Id. at 1-6715, 1 102(4), 3 C.M.L.R. at 37.
See id.
See id. at 1-6699,
62, 3 C.M.L.R. at 23.
See id. at 1-6699,
63, 3 C.M.L.R. at 23.
See id. at 1-6699,
64, 3 C.M.L.R. at 23-24.
See id. at 1-6699,
65, 3 C.M.L.R. at 24.
See id. at 1-6700,
66, 3 C.M.L.R. at 24.
As an example ofjudicial creativity in this area, see European Parliamentv. CounC-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041-Chernobyl, standing for the Parliament to pro-
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no standing restrictions on applicants seeking damages for loss
caused by Community measures. 85 He then proceeded to make
short shrift of the objections to widening standing.8 6 He noted
that his suggestion did not depart from the wording of the EC
Treaty; that comparison with the ECSC Treaty was of limited relevance today in increasing active Community legal order in
which there was a correspondingly greater need for effective judicial protection against unlawful action; that the Community legal order had outgrown mere intergovernmental co-operation,8 7
and the Court was far more than an international tribunal; that
the deluge argument of the centralised Community judiciary being flooded out by a mass of litigation was overstated, and, finally, that procedural and jurisdictional reforms, some of which
had already been introduced and others which were envisaged
in the Treaty of Nice,88 could increase the efficiency of the case
handling by the Court of Justice.8 9
This Opinion, delivered to the Court hearing the case in
plenary session with a view to reconsidering its case law on individual concern, was followed by an aftershock from an at-firstsight surprising source. A few weeks later, on May 3, 2002, a
notably strong First Chamber of the CFI, sitting in extended
composition, delivered its judgment upon the admissibility issue
in Jigo-Quriet Cie v. Commission.9 ° Without in any way seeking to
tect its prerogatives, later codified and extended to privileged applicant, i.e., no requirement to show an interest) in amendments to the EC Treaty. See, e.g., Council v.
European Parliament, Case C-34/86, [1986] E.C.R. 2155, 2212; European Parliament v.
Council, Case C-295/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4193, 4236-37; European Parliament v. Council, Case C-271/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1689, 1719 (applying Article 231 of the EC Treaty
(ex Article 174)).
85. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6701-02, 1 72,
3 C.M.L.R. at 26; see also EC Treaty, supra note 12, arts. 235, 288, O.J. C 325/33 (2002),
at 128, 147.
86. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6702-05,
75-81, 3 C.M.L.R. at 27-29.
87. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 252, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 134-35.
88. For an overview of the judicial architecture of the European Union after Nice,
see Lawrence W. Gormley, The Judicial Architecture of the European Union after Nice, in
AccouNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 133 (A.M. Arnull & D.
Wincott eds., 2001).
89. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6705, 1 81, 3
C.M.L.R. at 29.
90. See Jigo-Qudrd, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 44,
1137. The judges were Bo Vesterdorf (President), Koen Lenaerts, Josef Azizi, Nicholas
James Forwood, and Hubert Legal.
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revise the wording of Article 230 of the EC Treaty itself, the CFI
proceeded to decimate the standard interpretation of individual
concern in Plaumann.9" It is particularly important in this case
to note that it concerned a situation in which no act had been
adopted at national level in pursuance of the Community regula92
tion involved, against which proceedings could be brought.
The CFI noted that although the regulation was of general application, the applicant was directly concerned as it was bound by
the regulation, which required the adoption of no further measures either at Community or national level.9 3 However, under
the existing case-law it was impossible to find that the applicant
was individually concerned: the applicant could not be individually differentiated, even though it was in practice the only operator fishing for whiting in the waters south of Ireland with vessels
over thirty meters in length; and while the applicant had had
meetings with the Commission, there were no procedural rights
conferred upon it under a specific scheme of Community legislation, and it had not produced evidence of the peculiar circumstances such as those in Extramet or Cordorniu.9 4 The Commis-

sion had argued that the applicant was not left without a remedy,
because it could seek damages under the second paragraph of
Article 235 of EC Treaty in conjunction with Article 288 of the
EC Treaty.9 5 However these submissions found no favour with
the CFI. Firstly, access to the courts was one of the essential elements of a Community based on the rule of law and was enshrined in the Community legal order.9 6 Secondly, the right to
an effective remedy before a court of competent jurisdiction was
based on the constitutional traditions common to the laws of the
Member States and also based on Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.9 7 Finally, the right to an
91. See id. at 11-2382,
47, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1150.
92. See id. at 11-2380,
39, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148.
93. See id. at 11-2377,
26, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1146.
94. See id. at 11-2380,
37, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148.
95. See id. at 11-2380,
40, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148.
96. See id. at 11-2380,
41, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148. Because of the complete system
of remedies to permit review of the legality of acts of the Community Institutions, see
Partiegcologiste 'Les Verts'v. EurapeanParliament,Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, [1987]
2 C.M.L.R. 343, in which the Court of Justice also noted that "[n]either [the Community's] [M]ember-States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether
the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter,
the Treaty." Id. at 1365, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 371.
97. SeeJdgo-Qu9rd I at 11-2380,
41, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148. European Convention
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effective remedy for everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union had been violated was
reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union proclaimed at Nice on December 7, 2000.98
Given that the Charter does not itself have legal force, this last
argument is essentially political in nature. However, soft law can
at the very least be a very effective aid to interpretation; it can be
relied upon to bolster a conclusion, and can be taken into account by the Court. 9
The CFI proceeded to examine whether in this case the applicant would be deprived of its right to an effective remedy if
the application were to be held inadmissible."' 0 It noted that no
action before a national court was possible, and adopted Advocate General Jacobs's argument about it not being possible to
require individuals to break the law in order to gain access to
justice. 10 1 Moreover, falling back on an action of the damages
would not result in the removal from the Community legal order
of a measure that was held to be illegal. 10 2 In any event, the
admissibility and substantive requirements relating to actions for
damages differed from those for action for annulment, and judicial review carried out in the former actions was limited to censuring sufficiently serious infringements of rules of law intended
to confer rights on individuals, whereas in the latter case judicial
review was more comprehensive. 0 3 This led to the inevitable
conclusion, that neither the possibility of using Article 234 of the
EC Treaty, nor of an action in damages could be regarded as
guaranteeing persons the right to an effective remedy enabling
them to contest the legality of measures of general application
which directly affected their legal situation.10 4 Without in any
way wishing to do anything other than respect the procedures
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222, in its present form contained in Protocol No. 11 thereto (ETS No.
155) (entered into force November 1, 1998).
98. SeeJgo-Qur9Iat11-2381,
42, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 at 1148; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, O.J. C 364/1 (2000).
99. See, e.g., Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case
22/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651; United Kingdom v. Commission, Case C-106/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-2728.
100. SeeJego-Qu6r9 , [2002] E.C.R. at 2381,
43, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1148-49.
101. See id. at 2381,
45, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1149.
102. See id. at 2382, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1149-50.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 2382, 47, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150.
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established by the EC Treaty,10 5 the CFI agreed with Advocate
General Jacobs that there was no compelling reason to read into
the notion of "individual concern" in the fourth paragraph of
Article 230 of the EC Treaty a requirement that an applicant
seeking to challenge the general measure had to be differentiated from all others affected by it in the same way the addressee. 10 6 Accordingly, the CFI felt that reconsideration of the
previous strict interpretation of that notion of individual concern was appropriate, 10 7 and it adopted the following view:
A natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually
concerned by a Community measure of general application
that concerns him directly if the measure in question effects
his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his right or by imposing obligations on
him. The number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure,
or who may be so, are of no
08
regard.1
that
in
relevance
The conclusion was that the applicant, who was clearly affected
by the scope and provisions of the regulation, was individually
concerned, and, as direct concern had also been established, its
10 9
action was admissible.
It is perhaps somewhat inevitable that the Court of Justice
felt that its toes had been trodden on, given that it was still deliberating on UPA. A number of reasons support the conclusion
that the CFI was correct to act when it did, however. First of all,
although it was (at that time) attached to the Court of Justice, it
has its own jurisdiction, subject to appeal on a point of law to the
Court of Justice." 0 It does not have to wait for the Court of Jus105. The CFI clearly had an eye to the Court ofJustice looking over its shoulder by
specifically stating that it was not redrafting the EC Treaty, although the Court of Justice does that itself on occasion-e.g., Article 231 of the EC Treaty confers power on
the Court to decide which effects of an annulled regulation shall be considered definitive, but the Court has interpreted that provision by analogy to give itself the same
power in respect of directives. See, e.g., European Parliament v. Council, Case C-295/90,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-4193, 4236-37.
106. SeeJjgo-QurW, [2002] E.C.R. at 2383,
49, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150.
107. See id. at 2383, 50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150.
108. Id. at 2383, 51, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150.
109. See id. at 2384,
52-54, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150-51.
110. See Protocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice, art. 19, annexed to the TEU,
the EC Treaty, and the Euratom Treaty, OJ. C-325/167 (2002), at 180. If a case is
remitted to the CFI by the Court of Justice for re-determination in accordance with a
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tice to act: it can form its own view... in its original jurisdiction
because the CFI is perfectly entitled to depart from an earlier
line taken by the Court of Justice if the circumstances so demand.1 12 Secondly, judicial development often takes place in a
dialogue. A lower court-or a dissenting judge-may often in
the long-term have its or his or her view adopted by higher
courts. English lawyers only have to think of Lord Denning's
views on the citation of Hansard in court and by judges eventually triumphing in the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords
to illustrate that point."1
Thirdly, if the CFI had blindly followed the Plaumann approach, this would very clearly have left
the applicant helpless. Given that the Court of Justice had already decided to hear UPA in plenary session with a view to reconsidering its case law on individual concern, a speedy decision
by the CFI would offer the possibility that its views could be
taken into account by the Court of Justice in its deliberations as
part of the existing corpus of law. But while some sensitive souls
in the Court of Justice may have felt that the CFI was acting like
an upstart, such feelings resemble those of a patient with a terminal case of wounded pride. It would, with the utmost possible
respect, be manifestly wholly inappropriate if the CFI were unable to contribute the judicial, academic, and even policy dialogue about judicial protection simply for fear of treading on
somewhat judicial toes of varying length. Even the Court of Justice itself is not infallible, nor does it always arrive at results
clearly supported by the premises on which they are based. Even
point of law decided on appeal by the Court of Justice, the CFI is then bound by that
decision on the point of law involved. See id. art. 61, at 181.
111. See id. art. 54, at 179.
112. See id. art. 54, at 179. See, e.g., Altmann et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases T177/94 & 377/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11-2041 (departing from Ainsworth et al. v. Commission
& Council, Joined Cases C-271/83, 15, 36, 113, 158, 203/84 & 13/85, [1987] E.C.R. I167, because of changes in nature of JET project). The CFI thus followed the analysis
advocated by Advocates General Mischo and VerLoren van Themaat in that earlier
case.

113. See Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.), (overruling
on this point Davis v.Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264 (H.L.)). As to Lord Denning's approach,
see Davis v. Johnson, [1978] 1 All E.R. 841 at 850-52-although as to the substantive
result the House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal. But Lord Denning demonstrated that there was a perfect way around the views of the House of Lords by quoting
Hansard in Davis, and quoting someone else citing Hansard. See R. v. Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England, ex parte Bradford
Metropolitan City Council, [1979] E.C.R. 2 (elaborating on the meaning of maladministration).
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a long-standing line of authority which is widely perceived to be
perverse or no longer appropriate must be open to challenge in
judicial as well as academic or even political fora.
But it seems that there is no limit to the deafness of the
Court of Justice to criticism of its standpoint on admissibility issues. Very shortly after the aftershock of the CFI's judgment in
Jgo-Qur, the Court of Justice delivered its reaction in its judgment in UPA. I 4 The Court noted that the particular findings of
the CFI in UPA that the regulation involved was of general application, that the appellants' specific interests were not affected,
and that the appellant did not satisfy the Plaumann criterion,
were not being challenged.1 1 The sole point at issue was therefore whether the appellant, as representative of its members,
could nevertheless have standing on the sole ground that, in the
absence of any legal remedy before the national courts, the right
to effective judicial protection required it." 6 The Court then
summarised its existing case law and reaffirmed the entitlement,
as a matter of Community law, of individuals to effective judicial
protection of rights they derive from the Community legal order."1 7 It also reaffirmed its often-stated view that the EC Treaty
had established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures for judicial review of Community acts, through direct and
indirect means." 8 The Court went on to state that it was for the
Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensured respect for the right to effective judicial
protection." 9 In that context, on the basis of what is now Article
10 of the EC Treaty, national courts were
required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in
a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge
before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the invalidity
120
of such an act.

114. See UPA, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
115. See id. at 6732,
32, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 45.
116. See id. at 6732,
33, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 45-46.
117. See id. at 6733-34, 99 34-41, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 46-47.
118. See id. at 6734, 9140, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47.
119. See id. at 6734,
41, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47.
120. Id. at 6735,
42, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47. In this case, the Court of Justice
took a similar view to that of the CFI in UPA, Case T-173/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3357 at
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Like Advocate General Jacobs, it rejected the argument that the
non-availability of action at national level should allow direct action against the Community measure concerned: this would require the centralised Community judiciary to examine interpret
national procedural law in each case, something which was beyond their jurisdiction. 12 ' The Court noted that there had been
exceptional circumstances in which a litigant had demonstrated
that it was directly and individually concerned by a regulation,
but stated that such instances could not have the effect of setting
aside the condition of direct and individual concern which was
laid down in the EC Treaty itself.1 22 Any changes would have to
be made by way of revision of the EC Treaty using the procedure
12 3
of Article 48 of the EU Treaty.
This clearly bounced the ball in the direction of the Member States. On the one hand it is up to them to decide whether
to revise the Treaty; on the other hand national courts are required by Community law to be as accommodating as possible to
litigants seeking to challenge Community acts. While the points
made by the Court may be fair enough in themselves, the Court
wholly sidesteps the criticisms of Advocate General Jacobs and
the CFI; it misses the point completely. Advocate GeneralJacobs
himself rejected the idea that the availability or otherwise of
remedies at national level should be a determining criterion for
admissibility at the Community level.124 What both the Advocate
General and even more clearly the CFI sought to do was to expand the interpretationof the existing wording of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty in the manner in which
would avoid injustice yet be sufficiently certain to ensure that
cowboy litigants could notjeopardise the proper functioning of
3378-3379, 11 62-63 and SalamanderAG et al. v. European Parliament & Council, Joined
Cases T-172/98, T-175/98 & T-177/98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-2487 at 2516,
74, [2000] 2
C.M.L.R. 1099, 1118. The words "as far as possible" are new, however, and they clearly
echo the limitation of the obligation on national courts to interpret national law "as far
as possible" in conformity with Community directives. See, e.g., Wagner Miret v. Fondo
di Garantia Social, Case C-334/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6911 at 6932, 1 23, [1995] 2
C.M.L.R. 49, 64.
121. See UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 6735, 1 43, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47; see also Opinion
of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 6696-97, 71 5053, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 21-22.
122. See UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 6735, 44, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47-48.
123. See id. at 6735-36, 1 45, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 48.
124. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 6693-94, 4044, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 18-20.

676

FORDHAM IANFERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
1

[Vol. 29:655

25

the Community system.
It is all very well for the Court of Justice to say that if there
are changes to be made, it is up to the Member State to make
them, but this statement ignores the fact that it is unnecessary to
adapt the Treaty itself to permit more general standing, it would
be sufficient for the Court of Justice to revisit its interpretation
of the present wording of the Treaty. The interpretation advocated by the CFI is more worked out in detail than that proposed
by Advocate General Jacobs but undoubtedly shows the enormous influence of his Opinion.12 6 It has undeniable merits. It is
sufficiently demanding with the use of the phrase "it in a manner which is both definite and immediate" and sufficiently
targeted "by restricting his rights or imposing obligations on
him. ' 127 As noted above, it does not throw open the door to
cowboy applicants, but it does clearly complete-at Community
level-the system of remedies which Community law seeks to afford litigants. It has the undeniable advantage of removing litigants from the often arbitrary and sometimes only scantily informed venue of national law as a threshold that must be crossed
for a remedy in relation to the Community act concerned.
Already politically at Nice, 28 the need for credibility in the
eyes of citizens of the Union and other parties as to the transparent nature of Community legislative action and judicial protection has been acknowledged. It is no longer appropriate or acceptable that normative Community acts (outside special systems
such as competition, State aids, and anti-dumping) have for so
long been subject to scrutiny at the instance of a private party
who is clearly affected by those acts only if that party can either
convince a national judge to make a reference, or satisfy the centralized Community judiciary that there has been a sufficiently
serious infringement of a superior rule of law intended to confer
rights on individuals.129 As Advocate General Jacobs amply
101-103, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 36-38; see alsofgo-Qurg I,
125. See id. at 6712-13,
50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 44, 1137, 1150.
Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365, 2383,
126. Contra Jdgo-Qudrg I, [2002] E.C.R. at 2382-83, 47-51, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at
1150; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 6713-18, 1 102-103,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 36-38.
127. Jego-Qusrt, [2002] E.C.R. at 2383, 51, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 1150.
128. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, O.J. C
364/01 (2000).
129. See 1-1 COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 1.05, at (2)(c)(i)
(2nd ed. 2001 & Supp. 2005); see also BUSINESS GuIDE To EU INITIATIVES 2004, EU COM-
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demonstrated in his Opinion in UPA, the time is more than ripe
in the interpretation of the notion of individual
for an evolution
30
concern.
While it may be argued that changing the restrictive approach would centralise appeals, removing them from being
close to the citizen, whereas the Court of Justice's approach of
leaving normative challenges to be routed via the national courts
is more citizen friendly, that view ignores four key points. Firstly,
the existing approach leaves people without a remedy where
there is no national act to attack that is rooted in the Community act. Secondly, it makes more sense for issues of validity to be
decided as far as possible in the context of proceedings that permit speedy and effective remedies, including interim measures,
and it is well known that the Court of Justice feels that the centralised Community judiciary is the best forum for deciding such
matters. Thirdly, the approach of the CFI in fact promotes more
use of a one-stop shop instead of a possibly multilayered national
approach preceding a reference. Finally, it avoids litigants being
at the mercy on occasions of the whimsical approaches of national judiciaries that may refuse to make references in cases in
which the need to refer is glaringly apparent.
The Commission lodged an appeal in Jgo-Qure 131 a few
days before the judgment of the Court of Justice in UPA.'1 2 Ad2004, (2004); Court of First
Instance: Ruling in Favor of Individual's Right to Challenge EU Laws, EUR. INFO. SERVICE,
May 9, 2002, available at http://eisnet.eis.be/Content/Default.asp.html; Community
Law: Court Rules Individual Cannot Challenge Law of General Application, EUR. INFO. SERVICE, Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://eisnet.eis.be/Content/Default.asp.html.
130. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, UPA, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R.
82, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29-30. Advocate General Jacobs felt that the
1-6677, 6705,
Court of Justice's case law was hardly entirely consistent and settled, as there had been
some movement over the years; the Court of Justice's case law on standing was increasingly out of line with the administrative laws of the Member States. The establishment
of the CFI and the progressive transfer to it of all actions brought on by individuals
made it increasingly appropriate to enlarge the standing of individuals to challenge
general measures-and this could be achieved without stretching the wording of Article
230 of the EC Treaty. Finally, the case-law of the Court of Justice on the principle that
the national courts must offer effective judicial protection of rights granted under Community law made it increasingly difficult to justify narrow restrictions on standing
before Community courts.
131. See Commission v. J~go-Qur6 et Cie SA, Case C-262/02P, [2004] E.C.R. I3425, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12 [hereinafter Jgo-QurgIl].
132. The Commission lodged an appeal in Jgo-Qugr IonJuly 17, 2002, a few days
before the judgment of the Court of Justice in UPA on July 25, 2002.
MITTEE OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN BELGIUM
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vocate General Jacobs was once again called upon for his opinion. He accepted that in view of the judgment in UPA the Com13 3
mission had to succeed in its appeal on the admissibility issue.
However, he took the opportunity to make some general comments in the following terms:
As I explained in my Opinion in Uni6n de PequefiosAgricultores,
I find highly problematic the strict test of standing currently
applicable under the fourth paragraph of Art[icle] 230. In my
view, that test gives rise to a real risk that individuals will be
denied any satisfactory means of challenging before a court
of competentjurisdiction the validity of a generally applicable
and self-implementing Community measure. It may prove impossible for such individuals to gain access to a national court
(which in any event has no competence to rule on validity)
otherwise than by infringing the law in the expectation that
criminal (or other enforcement) proceedings will then be
brought against them when the national court may be persuaded to refer to the Court ofJustice the issue of the validity
of the measure. Besides the various practical disadvantages
which may attend the making of a reference in the context of
criminal proceedings, such a procedural avenue exposes the
individuals in question to an intolerable burden of risk.
Nor do Art[icle] 235 and the second paragraph of Art[icle]
288 appear to me to supply an adequate alternative remedy.
As the Court of First Instance stated in the present case, an
action for damages does not allow the Community judicature
to perform a comprehensive judicial review of all of the factors which may affect the legality of a Community measure.
For such an action to proceed, it is necessary for the applicant
to show a sufficiently serious infringement of rules of law intended to confer rights on individuals. The Commission is
not, in my view, correct to state that in order to determine
whether such an infringement has been shown, it will always
be necessary for a Community Court to undertake an exhaustive investigation of the legality of the measure at issue.
However, it clearly follows from the Court's judgment in
Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores that the traditional interpretation of individual concern, because it is understood to flow
from the Treaty itself, must be applied regardless of its consequences for the right to an effective judicial remedy.
133. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Jigo-QureII, Case C-262/02P, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-3425, -,
30, 41, 57, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12, 275, 277, 279.
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Such an outcome is to my mind unsatisfactory, but is the unavoidable consequence of the limitations which the current
formulation of the fourth paragraph of Art~icle] 230 is considered by the Court to impose. As the Court made clear in
Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores, necessary reforms to the Community system of judicial review are therefore dependent
upon action by the Member States to amend that provision of
the Treaty. In my opinion, there are powerful arguments in
favour of introducing a more liberal standing requirement in
respect of individuals seeking to challenge generally applicable Community measures in order to ensure that
full judicial
1 34
protection is in all circumstances guaranteed.
The battle for judicial revision had clearly been lost, although
the learned Advocate General was rightly not in recanting mode,
clearly finding the reasoning of the Court several slices short of a
picnic.
Unsurprisingly, in its judgment on appeal in Case C-263/
02P, Commission vfJgo-Qur
r et Cie SA 131 the Court of Justice simply recited its existing approach, repeating its reasoning in
UPA.136 It was unwilling to cope at Community level with the
situation in which there were no national measures for an applicant to challenge:
[A]n action for annulment before the Community Court
should not on any view be available, even where it is apparent
that the national procedural rules to not allow the individual
to contest the validity of the Community measure at issue unless he has first contravened it.
In the present case, it should be pointed out that the fact that
[the regulation concerned] applies directly, without intervention by the national authorities, does not mean that a party
who is directly concerned by it can only contest the validity of
that regulation if he has first contravened it. It is possible for
domestic law to permit an individual directly concerned by a
general legislative measure of national law which cannot be
directly contested before the courts to seek from the national
authorities under that legislation a measure which may itself
134. Id. at -,
43-46, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. at 277-78 (internal citation omitted).
135. SeeJgo-QurdrIl, Case C-262/03P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12,
266. The date of pronouncement of the judgment was April 1, 2004, unfortunately
before midday.
136. See id., [2004] E.C.R. at ,
29-33, 36, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. at 286-87; see also
UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 6733-35,
37, 39-44, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. at 287-88.
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be contested before the national courts, so that the individual
may challenge the legislation indirectly. It is likewise possible
that under national law an operator directly concerned by
[the regulation] may seek from the national authorities a
measure under that regulation which may be contested
before the national court, enabling the operator to challenge
the regulation indirectly.
Although the condition that a natural or legal person can
bring an action challenging a regulation only if he is concerned both directly and individually must be interpreted in
the light of the principle of effective judicial protection by
taking account of the various circumstances that may distinguish an applicant individually, such an interpretation cannot
have the effect of setting aside the condition in question, expressly laid down in the Treaty. The Community Courts
would otherwise go beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the
Treaty.
That applies to the interpretation of the condition in question set out at para. [51] of the contested judgment, to the
effect that a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing
obligations on him.
Such an interpretation has the effect of removing all meaning
set out in the
from the requirement of individual concern
13 7
fourth paragraph of Art[icle] 230 EC.
While the Court of Justice is clearly not in a listening mood,
it in fact does little more than reiterate its belief that the Community legal order has established a complete system of remedies, and bounces the issue to the Member States.1 3 As has
been noted above, particularly in the case of regulations which
do not lead to national measures which themselves can be challenged, there is a gaping hole in the system of judicial protection, which the Court clearly feels it is not for it to fill. It is possible that the Court had in mind something akin to a declaration
in the English system of public law as a means whereby a ruling
could be sought indirectly from the Court of Justice as a step in
137. Jfgo-Qur II, [2004] E.C.R. at -,
34-38, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. at 287-88.
138. See id. at -,
31, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. at 286.
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national proceedings, but this is not at all clear. Leaving the initiative for indirect challenge to the legal systems of the Member
States is not likely to encourage the development of uniform judicial protection within the Community. Given that the Court
has over the years laid much emphasis upon the need for regulations in particular to be applied immediately in the same manner throughout the Community, it should be obvious that if
rights and obligations are to be applied in the same way so, too,
should remedies be available in the same way. In the third pillar 1 39 of European Union activity (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 4 ° still more commonly thought of by
its old title of Justice and Home Affairs) there is at the moment
considerable variable geometry in the willingness of the Member
State to permit their national courts to make references under
Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union ("EU Treaty"),141 a
situation which clearly leaves Union citizens in a number of
Member States without any obvious means of challenging Union
acts. That this is untenable was acknowledged in the Constitution with the abolition of such a cafeteria approach to jurisdiction.14 2 Moreover, the Court's response to the point about private parties being forced in effect to break the law in order to
force a civil or criminal (or indeed administrative) law action to
mount a challenge to certain Community regulations"' is wholly
unsuccessfully parried with the specious argument that Member
States could invent what in some cases would have to be a wholly
new type of procedure in order to cope with the problem. While
the present writer is the last to seek to diminish the dynamic and
far-reaching scope of the duty of cooperation incumbent on
Member States under Article 10 of the EC Treaty,1 4 4 this ap139. For description of the "third pillar" of Community law, see GEORGE A. BER(1993) 17, 63-65.
140. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 29-42, O.J. C
325/5 (2002), at 21-28, 37 I.L.M. 67.
141. This gives the Member States the choice of whether to accept the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings.
142. See Constitution, supra note 13, art. 111-369, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 161. The
present provisions of Article 35 of the EU Treaty have not been included in the Constitution.
143. SeeJ go-Quer9II, Case C-262/03P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425, -,
30-31, [2004] 2
C.M.L.R. 12, 286.
144. See, e.g., J. Temple Lang, The Core of the ConstitutionalLaw of the CommunityArticle 5 EC, in CURRENT AND FUTURE PERSPEcTIVES ON EC COMPETIrION LAw, EUROPEAN
MONOGRAPHS 14, 41 (L.W. Gormley ed., 1997); L.W. Gormley, Proportionality: Review of
MANN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw
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proach is a bit rich to say the least. It is because of the Community system that people are left without a possible remedy, not
because of the national legal systems as such. It is the Community regulation concerned which effectively indicates whether additional authorised steps need to be taken by the Member
States.' 4 5 The reasoning of the Court in UPA is, with as much
respect as the reasoning undoubtedly deserves, wholly unconvincing, and that in Jigo-Qur9,while logically consistent with that
in UPA, is just as flawed. The failure of the Court of Justice to
take on board the serious criticisms of its case law made byjudicial colleagues and academics1 4 6 is a major shortcoming in its
fulfilment of its legal obligation to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty the law is observed.1 4 7
Since Jggo-Querj the dust has settled on the Plateau de Kirchberg somewhat, although the Court's deafness has not meant
that critics of its approach have given up. 4 ' Even the Commission has asked the Court, in the context of State aids, to clarify
the notion of "individual concern" once and for all.' 4 9 It may
Community Measures, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw EUROPEAN
25, 113 (Bernitz & J. Nergelius eds., 2000); C.-F. Durand, COMMENTAIRE
MPGRET: LE DROrr DE LA CEE I 25-63 (M. Waelbroeck et al. eds., 2nd. ed., 1992).
145. It is trite law that a regulation cannot be implemented by national legislation
(to do so would disguise the Community nature of the directly applicable obligations
and rights flowing from a regulation), but a regulation may well itself require that Member States take, for example, appropriate measures to penalize-whether in the criminal, civil or administrative spheres-breaches of the regulation.
146. See generally Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court ofJustice: TakingRights Seriously?, 12 LEGAL STUD. 227 (1992); Gunnar W.G. Karnell, The European Sui
Generis Protection of Data Bases: Nordic and UK. Law Approaching the Court of the European
Communities-Some Comparative Reflections, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v USA 983 (2002); Mark
Beunderman, SloveniaJoins ConstitutionRevival Camp (Jan. 12, 2006), availableat http://
euobserver.com/; Mark Beunderman, Fresh EU Presidency Attacks ECJ (Jan. 3, 2006),
available at http://euobserver.com/.
147. This is an obligation under Article 220 of the EC Treaty. See EC Treaty, supra
note 12, art. 220, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 122. It is now an obligation imposed on the
Court of Justice and on the CFI, each within its jurisdiction.
148. See generally Koen Lenaerts & Tim Corthaut, JudicialReview as a Contribution to
the Development of European Constitutionalism, 22 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 1 (2003); Christopher
Brown & John Morijn, Case-note: JLgo-Qur-Judgment of I April 2004, 41 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 1639 (2004); Filip Ragolle, Access toJustice ForPrivate Applicants in the Community Legal Order: Recent (R)evolutions, 28 EUR. L. REv. 90 (2003); Cornelia Koch, Locus
Standi of PrivateApplicants Under the EU Constitution: Preserving Gaps in the Protection of
Individuals'RightTo an Effective Remedy, 30 EUR. L. REv. 511 (2005);John A. Usher, Direct
and Individual Concern-an Effective Remedy Or a ConventionalSolution?, 28 EUR. L. REv.
575 (2003).
149. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Commission v. Aktionsgemeinschaft
MONOGRAPHS
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well be that in time the Court will reconsider: its composition is
changing quite rapidly; some newjudges are known advocates of
reform in their extra-judicial writings (although the processes of
judicial decision-making and academic writing are indeed discrete) ,15 although it may well take some time for the reformminded to achieve a majority. The advice to the Court is simple:
prick up your ears! 51 The other option is for the Member States
to pick up the ball thrown in their direction, so that advice could
also be addressed to the Member States (which is what the Court
has effectively done). A start in this direction has undoubtedly
been made in the Constitution.15 2
II. THE APPROACH IN THE CONSTITUTION
By far the most interesting development in the judicial architecture of the Constitution is the rather cryptic formulation
of the standing provisions in Article III-365.153 The traditional
distinction between privileged and semi-privileged litigants is
maintained, with the Committee of the Regions being given
semi-privileged status (the right to seek annulment of an act in
order to protect its prerogatives) .154 The dramatic change
comes in Article 111-365(4), which makes a distinction between
actions brought by a legal or natural person against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to him or her, and actions brought by such a person against
a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and
Recht und Eigentum, Case C-78/03P (pending; Opinion Transcript Feb. 24, 2005), 1
101. Aktionsgemeinschafi is an appeal against the judgment of the CFI in Aktionsgemeinschafi Recht und Eigentum v. Commission, Case T-114/00, [2002] E.C.R. 11-5121.
150. Koen Lenaerts is one such judge. See generally Koen Lenaerts & Tim Corthaut,
JudicialReview as a Contribution to the Development ofEuropean Constitutionalism,22 Y.B. OF
EUR. L. 1 (2003).
151. See European Convention, Secretariat, Oral Presentationby M. Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, President of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, to the "Discussion
Circle" on the Court ofJustice on 17Februay 2003, CONV 572/03 (1) 3-5 (Mar. 10, 2003);
see also European Convention, Secretariat, OralPresentationby M. Bo Vesterdorf Presidentof
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, to the Discussion Circle on the Court of
Justice on 24 February 2003, CONV 575/03 (1) 4-5 (Mar. 10, 2003). The Court ofJustice
and the CFI made proposals relating to Article 230 of the EC Treaty to the Discussion
Circle on the Court of Justice in the Convention, which merely further exposed the
divisions in judicial thinking-also among the members of the CFI.
152. See Constitution, supra note 13, arts. 11-107, 11-112 (4)-(5), 11-113, O.J. C 310/1
(2004) 52-54.
153. See id. art. 111-365, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 159-60.
154. See id.
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does not entail implementing measures. 15 5 The phrase "regulatory act" only occurs in this provision. 156 The views of the Discussion Circle on the Court in the Convention 15 7 which preceded
the Intergovernmental Conference15 8 which drew up the final
Treaty were divided:
Members of the circle who were in favour of amending the
fourth paragraph of Article 230 expressed a preference for
the option mentioning "an act of general application". Some
members, however, considered that the term "a regulatory
act" would be more appropriate, since it would enable a distinction to be made between legislative acts and regulatory
acts, maintaining a restrictive approach in relation to actions
by individuals against legislative acts (for which the "of direct
and individual concern" condition remains applicable) while
providing for a more open approach to actions against regulatory acts.
The Praesidium has adopted the latter approach and proposes that provision be made for actions by natural or legal
persons against regulatory acts which are of direct
concern to
15 9
them without entailing implementing measures.

In this view, the key distinction is between legislative and nonlegislative acts. 6° If an act is adopted as a European law or
155. See id. art. 111-365 (4), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 160.
156. The Constitution distinguishes between European laws, framework laws, regulations, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. See id. art. 1-33, O.J. C 310/1
(2004), at 26. A European law corresponds with the present regulations, and a framework law with the present directives. European regulations are non-legislative acts of
general application for the implementation of legislative acts-European laws and
framework laws-and of certain provisions of the Constitution. See id. art. 1-34, O.J. C
310/1 (2004), at 27. Their legal effects may correspond to those of a present regulation or of a present directive, and may take the form of delegated European regulations
adopted by the Commission. See id. art. 1-36, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 28. European
decisions correspond to the present decisions and are non-legislative in nature. See id.
art. 1-33, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 26.
157. The Convention, chaired by Valfry Giscard d'Estaing, presented its Draft
Constitution on July 18, 2003. See Elisabeth Zoller, The Treaty Establishing a Constitution
For Europe and the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 391, 392 (2005).
158. The Intergovernmental Conference of the Member States, convened under
Article 48 of the EU Treaty. See id.
159. European Convention, Praesidium, Articles on the Court ofJustice and the High
Court, CONV 734/03, at 20 (May 12, 2003).
160. See Constitution, supra note 13, arts. 1-34, 1-35, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 27. As
to the binding nature of the legal acts of the Community, see id. art. 1-33, O.J. C 310/1
(2004), at 26.
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framework law, individuals can only challenge it if they can show
direct and individual concern. 61 From the point of view of an
individual, this is actually a slight improvement, as it is impossible for an individual to challenge a directive (the predecessor of
a framework law) in the EC system; 16 2 an individual is left to the
indirect challenge via a reference in3 the course of a challenge to
16
national implementing measures.'
European regulations and decisions are clearly non-legislative acts, but may not always be regulatory acts,' so the use of
the term "regulatory acts" is distinctly unfortunate. However,
the burden of Article 111-365(4) 165 would appear to be that nonlegislative acts could be challenged if direct concern can be
shown, and the act does not entail implementing measures.
That latter point is itself not entirely clear. It appears that it was
designed to address the lacuna exposed in Jgo-Quir166 of a person being forced to break the law in order to elicit proceedings
in the course of which a challenge could be mounted to a Community regulation which did not require national implementing
measures."' Accordingly, it would appear that what was intended by the framers of the Constitution was that the regulatory
161. See id. art. 111-365 (4), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 159.
162. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, The Queen v. Secretary of State for
Health, ex parte British-American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. Et al., Case C-491/01, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-11453 at 11482,
49, [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 14, 460. It may be possible to find
direct concern after transposition, although not beforehand. See, e.g., SCHERMERS &
WAEIBROECK, supra note 14, 459, § 918; SalamanderAG et al. v. European Parliament &
Council, Joined Cases Joined Cases T-172/98, T-175/98 & T-177/98, [2000] E.C.R. II2487, 2513-2515, 11 62-68, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 1099, 1116-1117; Associacion Espafiola de
Impresas de la Carne (Asocarne) v. Council, Case C-10/95 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4149,
4160,
32. The Court, affirming the CFI's decision, found it unnecessary to decide
whether a private party should treat directives like regulations for the purpose of ruling
on the admissibility of an action. See Associacion Espafiola de Impresas de la Came
(Asocarne) v. Council, Case T-99/94, [1994] E.C.R. 11-871 at 880-81,
18-21.
163. See, e.g., The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British-American
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. et al., Case C-49/01, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, [2003] 1
C.M.L.R. 14.
164. A European decision may be more individual in character (but can always be
attacked by the addressee or by interested parties who can show direct and individual
concern), although it may be more general.
165. See Constitution, supra note 13, art. 111-365 (4), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 159.
166. SeefJfgo-Qure I, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365.
167. The CFI was clearly heavily influenced by this consideration, but the Court of
Justice was less convinced. See also the Judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in Posti & Rahko v. Finland, (No. 27824/95) 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 6, 158, 174,
64
(2003).
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act does not entail nationalimplementing measures. In this scenario, the equality of judicial protection would require that it is
the Union act itself which is determinative of whether or not it
entails implementing measures. 16 However, implementing acts
in the Constitution may be national implementing measures (Article 1-37(1)) 169 or acts adopted by the Commission or the Council in implementation of parent Union acts (Article 1-37(2)170;
the latter being called European implementing
regulations or
171
European implementing decisions.
Standing requirements are thus made to depend on the
type of act involved, and the choice of the type of act, if not
specified in the Constitution, is left to the Union institutions to
decide "on a case-by-case basis, in compliance with the applicable procedures and with the principle of proportionality referred to in Article I-11.11172 While Barents1 73 points out that the
Court has always set its face against the degree of judicial protection being dependent on the choice of the legislator,1 74 this is
really aimed at arbitrary misuse of power to seek to escape challenges. The terms of Article 1-38(1)171 would seem to leave the
Court free to examine whether there has been any misuse of
power. There are, however, likely to be arguments advanced
that what is adopted in the form of a legislative act is in fact a
regulatory act; a return to the bad old days of the Sixties may be
in the cards!

168. Thus, it would not matter for standing if a Member State did in fact implement the regulatory act. A Member State which implements a Union act which needs
no implementation may, however, find itself with problems for disguising the Community nature of the obligation involved-just as is the case with regulations at present,
unless the regulation itself requires specific Member State action, such as providing for
penalties for non-compliance.
169. See Constitution, supra note 13, art I 37(1), O.J. C310/1 (2004), at 28.
170. See id. art. 37(2), 0.J. C310/1 (2004), at 28.
171. See id. art. 37 (1)-(2), 0.J. C310/1 (2004), at 28.
172. See id. art. 38(1), 0.J. C310/1 (2004), at 29.
173. RENE BARENTrs, Een Grondwet voor Europa 525 (2005).
174. For example, according to settled case law, in the context of the organization
of Community powers, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective
factors that are amenable to judicial review. Those factors specifically include the aim
and content of the measure. See Parliament v. Council, Case C-271/94, [1996] E.C.R. I
1689, 1-1701,
14; see also Parliament v. Council, Case C-42/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-869,
36); Commission v. Council, Case C-269/97 [2000] E.C.R. 1-2257 at 2290,
43.
175. See Constitution, supra note 13, art. 1-38(1), O.J. C 310/0 (2004), at 29.
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III. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The present state of judicial review in relation to the fourth
paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty is still fundamentally
unsatisfactory. Indirect routes using national courts do not offer
a reliable route for exercising a fundamental right to judicial review, 1 7 6 and the room for evaluating circumstances specific to
each applicant individually is in fact very limited indeed.1 77 In
view of the unlikelihood of a wholesale revision of the Plaumann
interpretation in the immediate future by the Court, the way forward could indeed lie in a Treaty amendment. Elsewhere the
present writer has advanced an amendment to the present text
of Article 230 of the EC Treaty 78 to take account of public interest litigation, 179 but perhaps the present wording of direct and
individual concern could usefully be replaced by incorporating
the CFI's definition of individual concern from Jggo-Qu&r. The
amended fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty
would then read:
Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision
addressed to another person is of direct [concern to him and
affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite
and immediate, by restricting his rights or imposing obligations on him.]" 0
It is obvious from this wording that standing would become
a much more transparent concept and that the number of potential litigants would increase, but it is submitted that this is a
small price to pay for a major improvement in the system ofjudi176. See the very convincing set of reasons given by Schermers and Waelbroeck,
supra note 14, 453-54, § 910, and the clear analysis of Lenaerts and Corthaut, supra note
148, at 12-19.
177. See Commission v. Camar Srl et al., Case C-312/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11355,
11428; see also, Lenaerts & Corthaut, supra note 148, at 20. Note that the CFI has some
margin of appreciation in assessing the facts and deducing the relevant factors in determining whether an applicant is individually concerned, but acknowledges that this is
very limited in view of Commission v. Nederlandse Antillen, Case C-142/OOP, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-3483.
178. See EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 126.
179. See Laurence W. Gormley, Public Interest Litigation, in I LIBER AMICORUM
SLYNN, supra note 4, 191 at 197 (adding a new fifth paragraph to Article 230 of the EC
Treaty).
180. EC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 126.
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cial review in Community law. The essentially managerial floodgates argument is not a sufficiently weighty reason to retain a
system of judicial protection that no longer enjoys the confidence of those who are affected by it, particularly in view of the
huge developments in the widening of judicial review in many
Member States over the last twenty years. It may be objected that
this draft would permit challenges to normative Community acts
on a much broader scale than now, 181 and would in effect permit
an actio popularis. Lenaerts and Corthaut point out that some
Member States do permit challenges to legislation if a sufficient
interest can be demonstrated. 82 It is submitted that the Community legal order is now well-enough established to be able to
afford to Union citizens and other interested parties modern,
open access to justice which is not constrained by artificial interpretations of the concept of "individual concern." There is absolutely no reason to be afraid of the CFI's approach in Jggo-Qurg.
At a time in which the liberties of the citizen are under steady
erosion in the name of security, the need for an adequate system
of judicial protection which affords those affected by Community action the right to be heard in Court has never been
greater. Indirect judicial protection is not a right but a mere
chance.
While the Court ofJustice has been unwilling to pick up the
ball offered it by the CFI, the efforts of the Constitution to improve on Article 230 of the EC Treaty have not resulted in very
much in the way of transparency: the attempt to introduce a
clear hierarchy of norms has not translated into clarity for judicial review, so the avenue of a Treaty amendment is perhaps less
likely to be followed in the near future, given the unpromising
future of the Constitution. 8 3 Leaving the ball in the forum of
the national legal systems is not an option which will afford an
equal level of judicial protection to private parties. The ball returns firmly to the hands of the Court of Justice, which should
181. See generally Angela Ward, Locus Standi Under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty:
Craftinga Coherent Test for a "Wobbly Polity," 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 45 (2003) (proposing opening up locus standi in areas in which the Community institutions and the Member States
share implementation duties).
182. See Lenaerts & Corthaut, supra note 148, at 23.
183. That does not mean, however, that the Constitution is now devoid of interest;
it will be the inevitable starting point for any further attempts to revise the EU and EC
Treaties. See generally JEAN-CLAUDE PiRis, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (2006).

2006]

JUDICIAL REVIEW ADVICE FOR THE DEAF?

acknowledge that at least in the Jgo-Qu6r4 situation it has failed
dismally; moreover, it has failed to address adequately or at all
the argument that its own interpretation in Plaumann is simply
misconceived. If there might have been something to be said for
it in the early 1960's-and the present writer is not of such opinion-there is nothing to be said for it nowadays. Community law
is dynamic, develops with the times and is not stuck in an era in
which judicial review in the Member States was highly underdeveloped. It is time that the Community ceased to offer less substantial judicial protection than that which citizens have a right
to expect. What is beyond doubt in any event is that the CFI was
logically entirely right to say that the number and position of
other persons who are likewise affected by the Community measure are of no relevance to determining whether a litigant is individually concerned."8 4 It cannot be right that the Community
system does not offer a complete system of remedies to litigants,
and the Court of Justice is simply incorrect to claim that it does.
Time to prick up your ears!
VALEDICTORY
Francis Jacobs has been one of the great Advocates General
at the Court, and his wise counsel will be sorely missed in Luxembourg, where his measured but often devastating analysis has
shown the way forward in so many fields of law. He has tirelessly
devoted himself to the development of European law, giving unstintingly of his time and energy to academic and professional
bodies and to the elucidation of the judiciary. The seeds of reform in judicial review which he has sown will develop and multiply in time; the ground on the Plateau de Kirchberg may not yet
be as fertile as might be hoped, but the time will come when
more people are ready to listen. Then his ideas on judicial review will be found after all to have fallen in the rich soil, and will
be taken up by "people with a noble and generous heart who
have heard the word and take it to themselves and yield a harvest
through their perseverance. '18 5

184. SeeJego-Qufrd, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365, 11-2383,
C.M.L.R. 44, 1150.
185. Luke 8:15 (Jerusalem Bible).

51, [2002] 2

